Darfur already has become a synonym for dithering by outside powers in the face of genocide. Soon it may also deliver another grim verdict on the ability of the Security Council to back up its own resolutions. Hamstrung by the unwillingness of veto-wielding members, such as China, to intervene, it delayed action for months, then watered down the language it finally adopted on July 30 to omit any direct sanction against the Sudanese regime. Days after that, an agreement between U.N. and Sudanese officials further weakened the pressure on Khartoum: Among other things, it converted a requirement that the government-sponsored Janjaweed militia be disarmed into a Sudanese promise to provide a list of those it admits to controlling.

The government also pledged to set up safe areas to which the more than 1 million displaced people in Darfur could go, protected by its security forces. According to reports by human rights groups, it then proceeded to draft members of the Janjaweed into those very forces, while rounding up a few petty criminals whom it parades as captured militants. It eliminated some of the red tape hampering humanitarian groups but has continued to block aid deliveries on security grounds. The strategy is obvious: to foster the illusion of responsiveness, and thereby thwart any agreement by the Security Council on further action, while allowing its campaign against Darfur's non-Arab population to continue.